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The Doctrine of Total People’s 
Defence – what Yugoslav armed forces 
learned from their past
Blaž Torkar
The article presents the development of the Yugoslav Military Doctrine 
and the Yugoslav Armed Forces from 1945 to the 1980s. The Social-
ist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia developed the concept of General 
People’s Resistance and Social Self-Protection which was defending the 
freedom, national independence, sovereignity, and the self-managing 
socio-political system. The new doctrine also formed two defence com-
ponents, the Yugoslav People’s Army as the operational army, and the 
Territorial Defence as the highest organisational form of defence and 
armed combat under the authority of republics and regions. Despite the 
well-conceived concept of the General People’s Defence and Social Self-
Protection, the latter failed to find answers on how to defy the “inter-
nal enemy” and how to solve internal political, economic, and national 
problems, which amassed in Yugoslavia of the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Slovenian Territorial Defence was something positive, which derived 
from the Doctrine of Total People’s Defence. Since its establishment in 
1968, the Slovenian Territorial Defence developed differently from the 
other federal republics and was increasingly considered as the Slovenian 
armed forces.
Socialist Yugoslavia was formed after the end of the Second World War. 
Unlike the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe that came to 
power because of the Soviet military dominance, Tito’s post-war com-
munist regime in Yugoslavia came to power by and large through its own 
political and military efforts during the national liberation and civil war 
from 1941 to 1945. Despite its federal form, the new state was, in the ini-
tial post-war period, highly centralised both politically and economically. 
Tito’s Communist Party held the reins of power and the constitution was 
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closely modelled on that of the Soviet Union. However, a succession of 
new constitutions, adopted in 1953, 1963 and 1974, contributed to the 
formation of a more federal and liberal country.1
Its armed forces, presented by the Yugoslav Army (YA)2, had a very 
important role in the country. In the end of the 1960’s and at the begin-
ning of the 1970’s, Yugoslavia adopted the concept and doctrine of Total 
People’s Defence as the permanent form of defending the freedom, sov-
ereignty, national independence, and the “self-managing” socio-political 
system. However, historical development of the new doctrine began 
much earlier, in the period of the Second World War and during the par-
tisan guerrilla warfare, which was typical for the Yugoslav National Lib-
eration Movement. After the Second World War, the experiences from 
the national liberation war were adapted and incorporated into the new 
military doctrine. Advancements in military technology, and anticipa-
tions of the development of international politics influenced the doctrine 
as well.3
The development of the Yugoslav armed forces  
and military doctrine from 1945 to 1969 
The first period of the development of the armed forces (1945–1958) can 
be further divided into two subperiods, namely the 1945–1949 and the 
1949–1958 periods. The era from the end of the Second World War and 
up to approximately 1949 may be referred to as the period of revolution-
ary etatism. In this period, post-war circumstances strongly influenced 
the establishment of the Yugoslav Armed Forces. The Partisan Army was 
reorganised into a peacetime structure, there were instances of demo-
bilisation and first recruitments, the new army was formally regulated 
1 More about the history of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia see: Dušan 
Bilandžić, Historija Socialističke Federativne republike Jugoslavije. Glavni procesi 1918–1985 
(Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1985).
2 On 22 December 1951 the Yugoslav Army (YA) was renamed the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(YPA).
3 More about the role of the Yugoslav Armed forces in the Yugoslav “self-managing” socio-
political system see: Anton Bebler, Marksizem in vojaštvo (Ljubljana: Komunist, 1975).
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and the establishment of the new military industry was just around the 
corner. The Yugoslav Army (YA) was the key element for the defence and 
stability of the state, and the society as a whole. The emphasis on the 
development of the YA was placed on the improvement of organisation, 
formation, education and training.4
Maintaining absolute political control in difficult wartime conditions 
became a major problem, as the National Liberation Army expanded 
in size and reached 800.000 troops by early 1945. At the same time, 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) amounted to no more than 
140.000 members. The CPY leadership rightly feared the “militariza-
tion” of the Party. The reorganisation process of the Yugoslav Army was 
strongly influenced by the Soviet model since the army headquarters 
were manned by accredited Soviet instructors and YA personnel trained 
in the Soviet Union. In case of aggression, frontal operations were the 
cornerstone of military strategy. Those operations relied largely on the 
operational echelon.
The formation of partisan units had not been planned; the Corps of 
National Defence of Yugoslavia was the only military formation that 
retained its territorial character inside the republics. It was responsible for 
protecting the national border and a number of important buildings in the 
territory, and for the liquidation of military groups that had collaborated 
with the Axis Powers. The Yugoslav military doctrine abandoned the doc-
trine of the National Liberation Movement and copied the Soviet Military 
doctrine. After 1947, the Soviet Union started to train and educate reserve 
Yugoslav officers. The YA abandoned everything what was “partisan-like” 
and started to develop frontal-manoeuvre warfare. The Decree on the 
Establishment of the YA, dating back to March 1945, was an act by the fed-
eral government that among other things transformed the partisan detach-
ments into a regular army. The transformation progressed at the same time 
as the country was being liberated by the National Liberation Army.
During the National Liberation War, in the territory of Yugoslavia, the 
operational echelon consisted of brigades, divisions, corps, and armies, 
4 Zvezdan Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada (1945–1991) (Ljubljana: Defensor, 
2007), 31.
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while the territorial component was made up of detachments, under city 
and territorial command.5
A typical characteristic of the post-war period (1949–1958) was the 
Yugoslav split with the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union (the so-called 
Informburo Conflict). The Eastern Block failed to ideologically and 
economically influence Yugoslavia using the Resolution of the Inform-
buro. The Soviet Union had established Cominform, a weaker succes-
sor to Komintern, in 1947 to serve as a coordinating body for com-
munist parties in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, 
France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The establishment 
of Cominform signaled that the Soviet Union was once again setting 
itself up as the official leader of the communist bloc nations. Yugosla-
via was an original member, but Josip Broz-Tito proved to be reluctant 
in following the Soviet line. The cause for the Yugoslav–Soviet split was 
Stalin’s rejection of Tito’s plans to absorb Albania and Greece in coop-
eration with Bulgaria, thereby setting up a powerful Eastern European 
bloc outside Moscow’s control. Stalin ordered Yugoslavia expelled from 
Cominform.6
Gathering Soviet divisions close to the Yugoslav borders (in Hun-
gary, Romania, and Bulgaria) was a clear indication that the Soviet Union 
intended to invade Yugoslavia during the next phase of the political crisis. 
The Yugoslav Army and the state leaders made use of the lesson learned 
during the national liberation struggle and formed a Yugoslav Army’s ter-
ritorial-partisan component made up of partisan detachments.7 How-
ever, the political crisis never developed into a hot war between Yugosla-
via and the Soviet Union.
5 Ross A. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch (Santa Mon-
ica: The Round Corporation, 1978), 3; Bojan B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslovenska narodna armija 
1945–1959 (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2014), 81–82; Oružane snage Jugoslavije, 
1941–1981 (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1982), 100; Zvezdan Marković, “Strategic Doc-
trine of the Yugoslav People’s Army – The Strategy of All-People’s Defence and Social Self-Pro-
tection,” – Strategic Planning for War, ed. Tomaž Kladnik (Ljubljana: Defensor, 2008), 55–56.
6 More about the Informburo Conflict and Yugoslavia’s opening towards the West see: Dmitar 
Tasić and Ivan Laković, The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West, 
1950–1954 (Harward: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
7 Marković, “Strategic Doctrine,” 55–56.
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In 1952, a three-party military assistance for Yugoslavia, provided by 
the USA, Great Britain and France was initiated. Soon the USA remained 
as the sole military donor. Consequently, the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(YPA) began to implement the military strategy in how to react in case of 
Soviet aggression and nuclear attack; specifically it established five-unit 
divisions with five-company regiments. At the peak of the build-up in 
1952, 22 percent of the national income was devoted to defence. Yugosla-
via received US military assistance worth three quarters of a billion dol-
lars in the 1950’s. But the improvement of Soviet–Yugoslav relations after 
1955 led to a gradual de-emphasis of defence in Yugoslavia.8
At the beginning of the 1950’s two theoretical documents had been 
prepared – document A and B. Document A defined the advantages of 
the aggressor, who was equipped with state-of-the-art technology, while 
document B defined the possible advantages of Yugoslavia. Document B 
underlined the importance of compensating for aggressors material and 
8 Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada, 188–189.
A Unit of the Yugoslav People’s Army standing with rifles. Courtesy Svetozar 
Busić, Archive of the Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana
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technical advantages by organising people into a mass resistance. This 
was the YPA’s tactic of responding to the possible aggression and applying 
the acquired lessons learned to new situations. The first milestone was the 
Military Service Act issued in 1951, which allowed for the possibility of 
forming a group of partisan detachments, a brigade, and a division under 
YPA command.9
The period from 1958 to 1969 was likewise divided into two sub-
periods, namely the period stretching from 1958 to 1964 and the period 
between 1964 and 1968. It all began with the introduction of the Doctrine 
of Total People’s Defence and ended with the search for the best solutions 
for the establishment of the Territorial Defence.
Originally the national defence and security system in Yugoslavia 
was called the General People’s Resistance and Social Self-Protection 
(Splošni ljudski odpor in družbena samozaščita), which was later renamed 
the General People’s Defence and Social Self-Protection (Splošna ljudska 
obramba in družbena samozaščita). The term Total People’s Defence was 
used mostly in foreign papers and books describing the Yugoslav defence 
and security system.
It was assumed that Yugoslavia was endangered by aggression, the 
radical objective of which included the use of nuclear weapon. In 1958, 
the doctrine of total people’s war was adopted. It provided for the forma-
tion of partisan units, special operations forces and territorial units, all 
part of the YPA. Further development of the operational army was moti-
vated by an alleged possibility of aggression through the use of nuclear 
weapons, mass armoured units, and airborne units.
There were two major reorganisations of the YPA, the first one 
between 1959 and 1961, and the second one between 1963 and 1965. The 
two reorganisations aimed at balancing the operational and territorial 
components of the YPA. Based on the political and strategic estimation 
that the threat from the East no longer existed, a decision was made to 
reduce the size of the YPA. Accordingly, the disbandment of units located 
north from the Drava, Sava, and Danube rivers, and east from the Morava 
river was carried out. By 1968 less than six percent of national income was 
9 Marković, “Strategic Doctrine,” 56.
193The Doctrine of Total People’s Defence …
spent on defence and the YPA had been reduced to nearly 200,000. The 
Non-Aligned Movement was reinforced and the international relations 
were influenced by general peace processes. This had a positive impact on 
the Yugoslav economy which in earlier times had been in a rather difficult 
situation.10
With the adoption of the People’s Defence Act in February 1969, the 
period between 1969 and 1985 introduced a new phase in the develop-
ment of the concepts of the General People’s Defence (Splošna ljudska 
obramba) and the armed forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The act laid down the unity and the composition of the armed 
forces, which comprised two parts, the Yugoslav People’s Army and the 
Territorial Defence. Despite the dual nature of the armed forces, the Yugo-
slav People’s Army presented the main, the most qualified, and the best 
equipped defence force. The general people’s defence territorial defence 
10 Oružane snage Jugoslavije, 106; Marković, “Strategic Doctrine,” 57; Ross A. Johnson, “Total 
National Defense in Yugoslavia” (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation 1971), 2.
Female soldiers of the Yugoslav People’s Army. Courtesy Miško Kranjec, 
Archive of the Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History, Lubjana
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system provided defence capabilities in the entire territory of the state 
also during a temporary occupation of a part of the state. Based on the 
mid-term and long-term plans and material capabilities of the state, the 
modernisation of the YPA and the development of its organisation and 
formation structure continued. Special emphasis was put on the develop-
ment of territorial defence.
In 1971, the YPA was affected by the movement called the Croatian 
Spring. The perception of the Croatian nation that they were being held 
in a disadvantageous and a subordinate position on their own territory 
was strongly refuted by Tito himself. All Party organisations of the YPA 
strongly opposed this “nationalist movement”. This consequently led to 
the inspection of Yugoslav armed forces. In the course of the confronta-
tion with the Croatian Spring movement, a number of Croatian senior 
officers and generals were forced to leave the army.
In parallel with the changes in the Yugoslav Defence Doctrine there 
were also the constitutional changes in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Con-
stitution from 1974 was the fourth and final constitution of the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The changes in the Yugoslav Defence 
Doctrine were seen also in the Constitution which also added elaborate 
language protecting the self-management system from state interference 
and expanding representation of republics and provinces in all electoral 
and policy forums. The Constitution called the restructured Federal 
Assembly the highest expression of the self-management system. Accord-
ingly, it prescribed a complex electoral procedure for that body, begin-
ning with the local labor and political organisations. Those bodies were 
to elect commune-level assemblies, which then would elect assemblies 
at province and republic level; finally, the latter groups would elect the 
members of the two equal components of the Federal Assembly, the Fed-
eral Chamber and the Chamber of Republics and Provinces. The consti-
tution also proclaimed Josip Broz Tito president for life.
After 1981, the armed forces of the Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia were affected by the consequences of the death of their 
supreme commander Marshal Tito; the Presidency of the SFRY as a col-
lective body did not have the same amount of influence and control over 
the entirely indoctrinated army as did its deceased supreme commander. 
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Being a large independent system the YPA developed into a “state within 
a state” whose development was not in line with the changes in the inter-
nal political and geopolitical arena.11
The new Yugoslav defence doctrine
Everything changed in 1968, when the Warsaw Pact forces intervened in 
Czechoslovakia. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact was 
viewed in Belgrade as evidence of a Soviet determination to throttle pos-
sible independent Communist countries and, as such, an “indirect attack” 
on Yugoslavia. It came as a great surprise for the state leaders and military 
supreme command. Yugoslavia appeared to be seriously threatened and 
the YPA had never in the entire post-war period been less prepared to 
protect it. Politicians and the military supreme command concluded that 
11 Oružane snage Jugoslavije, 110; Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada, 188–189.
An YPA armoured fighting vehicle during excercises. Courtesy Svetozar Busić, 
Archive of the Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana
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it was time to make use of the lessons learned from the National Libera-
tion Movement in the Second World War. It was decided that according 
to the present circumstances, the territorial component, responsible for 
people’s resistance, was to be established. This component was to operate 
alongside the YPA, but not within its structure. A completely new model 
of defence concept and the armed forces with a territorial component was 
developed.
The operational component would be the first in line to deter aggres-
sion. However, the territorial defence forces were planned to be the larg-
est form of organising people into combat units, and were under the 
authority of the republics and regions. This was the first opportunity for 
the republics to develop their own defence units. The General Staff initi-
ated the theoretical development of the General People’s Resistance and 
Social-Self Protection doctrine in accordance with the political stand-
points of the People’s Federation Council. In 1971, Yugoslavia organised 
the Svoboda-71 (Freedom-71) manoeuvre. The manoeuvre demonstrated 
the progress that Yugoslavia has made since 1968 in organising for defence 
according to the conception of total national defence. The distinctiveness 
of the approach was apparent when compared with defence preparations 
in the early 1950’s. Then, fearing a Soviet invasion, Yugoslavia carried out 
a massive conventional military build-up of almost a half-million men 
under arms, with a corresponding mobilisation capacity.12
During the presentation of the document “The Fundamentals of the 
War Doctrine” from 1970, the Yugoslav Armed Forces had been eman-
cipated from the persistent influence of foreign doctrines. The Yugoslav 
Armed Forces were capable of resisting an aggressor, made use of Yugo-
slavia’s lessons learned and refuted the defence thesis arguing that resis-
tance was possible only in depth. In the document “Armed Forces of the 
SFRY” the Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO)13 had been 
given greater importance and TO’s foundation had been reinforced. The 
TO was treated as the armed forces’ strategic component, integrated into 
all spheres of the society and having various organisational forms. TO 
12 Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada, 190; Johnson, “Total National Defense,” 1–2.
13 In the beginning the TO units were called partisan units.
197The Doctrine of Total People’s Defence …
YPA soldiers in trenches during military excercises. Courtesy Svetozar Busić, 
Archive of the Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana
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needed to stimulate people’s ability to offer long-term resistance against 
the aggressor, thereby enhancing the army’s operational echelon and 
ensuring more effective results than could be predicted considering likely 
force ratios.14
The Defence Act15 of 1969 provided, further, that it was the right and 
duty of every citizen to participate in national defence and the right and 
duty of the local political authorities to organise total national defence 
and to command units in battle directly. In this scenario, the YPA itself 
would engage the enemy in frontal warfare and expel him from the coun-
try. The TO in the affected border region would selectively assist the YPA 
and would remain on alert in the event that the military threat increased.
Far more likely than the above scenario, according to Yugoslav mili-
tary scholars, was the prospect of a massive attack led by the Soviet Union. 
In this case, the enemy would enjoy overwhelming military superiority in 
traditional terms. He can be expected to achieve general air superiority, to 
mount a massive armoured land invasion, and to attempt to quickly seize 
Belgrade, Zagreb, and other key cities by parachute troops and helicopter 
borne troops. In this scenario, the first task of the YPA was to employ 
frontal tactics and to avoid large losses, which would lead to the delay of 
the enemy’s penetration. The YPA units, withdrawing from border areas, 
would wage an active defence in depth alongside the TO throughout the 
country. The expected consequence was a merging of the front and rear, 
the transformation of the entire country into a “hedgehog”. YPA and TO 
units would fight on, utilising a mixture of combined and partisan tactics. 
On the “occupied” territory, both urban and rural, TO, and paramilitary 
forces would fight a guerrilla war. Only if the entire country would be 
occupied, however, would the YPA and TO units revert exclusively to 
partisan tactics, as in the Second World War.16
14 Marković, “Strategic Doctrine,” 58.
15 Zakon o narodni obrani. Ur. L. SFRJ 8/1969 (11 February 1969).
16 Johnson, “Total National Defense,” 3–4.
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The role of territorial defence
TO was treated as the armed forces’ strategic component which was to 
become the strongest military component, integrated into all spheres of 
society and having various organisational forms. The National Defence 
Act from 1969 conferred the use of legal sanctions to territorial defence 
units to stimulate people’s ability to offer long-term resistance against 
the aggressor. Legally and doctrinally TO units were equal to and not 
subordinated to the YPA. After the creation, TO expanded to a force of 
nearly one million, with a goal of attaining a three-million-strong force in 
the next few years. When Yugoslavia started building TO units the main 
emphasis was put on company-sized units at the local level. These units 
were intended for defence within the boundaries of the commune. In 
addition, the creation of TO units depended on the production in some 
factories and other economic organisations. Each Yugoslav republic also 
formed some larger (battalion-sized) highly mobile TO units capable 
of defence throughout the republic. The desire to form larger units was 
voiced by Tito at the conclusion of the manoeuvre Freedom-71. TO units 
were subordinated to defence commands, staffed by reserve YPA offi-
cers at the communal and republican level. The communal commander 
was responsible both to the communal political authorities and to the 
higher, republican territorial defence command. The TO republican 
commands had considerable autonomy; they were subordinated to the 
federal Supreme Command and were not part of the YPA chain-of-com-
mand. Local TO units fell under YPA tactical command only when they 
were engaged in joint operations with the YPA units. Training for total 
national defence was carried out in communal training centres, where 
reserve YPA officers instructed TO units. TO units were primarily armed 
with light anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons of domestic Yugoslav 
production supplemented by heavier mobile anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
weapons for battalion-size TO units. Weapons were stored in mobilisa-
tion centres and YPA storage sites, while personal equipment was kept 
at home.17
17 Ibid.; Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada, 190.
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After the new edition of the “Strategy of Armed Conflict” in 1983, 
TO was defined as the largest formation which during armed conflict also 
included working citizens (population) and particular self-protection 
activities, as well as the largest formation in charge of organising armed 
total people’s resistance. In the command structure, the commander of 
the republic TO was still subordinate to the supreme commander of 
Yugoslavia and the Federal Presidency. With regard to deployment, func-
tioning (operations) and preparations of units, the TO was subordinated 
to the republic’s authorities as well.18
The role of civil defence and civil protection
The post-1968 attention to TO in Yugoslavia had resulted in a de-empha-
sis of civil defence as conceived in the early 1960’s. TO also took over 
some activities, such as counter-intelligence and warning, which formerly 
were the responsibility of the civil defence. On the other hand, Yugoslav 
military doctrine envisaged an important role for civil defence forces, 
incorporating, in one form or another, the entire able-bodied population 
which was not included in the YPA or TO. The National Defence Act of 
1969 stipulated that each commune had to form a civil defence organisa-
tion, subordinated to the communal defence command. The civil defence 
organisation was subdivided into engineering, sanitation, radiation-
chemical-biological-defence and fire-fighting units, veterinary units, and 
evacuation and security units. The primary functions of the civil defence 
organisation were fire-fighting, public health, shelter, and limited evacu-
ation (wounded, children, and the aged).19
In the SFRY, Civil Protection was the only one of the four elements 
inside the system of Total People’s Defence (defence measures and civil 
protection, defence forces, people’s defence affairs, authorities in charge 
of peoples defence requirements) in its wider sense, which had the form 
of a system. Civil protection was an important segment of the Total 
18 Marković, Jugoslovanska ljudska armada, 195.
19 Johnson, “Total National Defense,” 6.
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 People’s Defence system as it was organised in all apartment buildings, 
settlements, companies, and other organisations. The field of Civil Pro-
tection activities encompassed protection of the population in the event 
of war as well as protection of the population from disasters and catastro-
phes. The main characteristic of civil protection was its mass presence in 
almost every social environment, both in terms of the territory and pro-
duction activity, which in short means, it was present everywhere where 
people worked – from the dwellings to other premises, and all the way to 
companies, local communities, and municipalities20
The role of the Yugoslav People’s Army
Acceptance of Total People’s Defence in Yugoslavia signified a profound 
change in the role of the YPA. It was testimony to both the flexibility of 
outlook of the YPA senior officer corps and the YPA’s institutional sub-
ordination to the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) and Tito per-
sonally, that the YPA apparently adapted to the new system of national 
defence without undue friction. The fundamental departure from earlier 
practice was the fact that the YPA was no longer the only Yugoslav mili-
tary institution, but complemented by a larger TO which was doctrinally 
and legally co-equal with and not, even in wartime, subordinated to the 
YPA. On the other hand, the new Yugoslav military doctrine did not call 
for the transformation of the YPA into a professional training corps for 
a single army of citizen-soldiers. That meant that every Yugoslav citizen 
had to cooperate in the system of General People’s Defence and Social 
Self-Protection. The YPA had to be able on its own both to resist a limited 
incursion to delay a massive attack so that the country could carry out 
20 More about Civil Protection in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: Božidar 
Javorović, Suvremeni sustavi civilne obrane: pregledna studija (Zagreb: Otvoreno sveučilište, 
1992); Milan Vučinić, Splošna ljudska obramba in družbena samozaščita SFRJ II: učbenik za 
višje šole in fakultete SFRJ (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1986); Miro-
slav Ulčar, Obramba in zaščita: priročnik za mladino, ki ne obiskuje šol srednjega usmerjen-
ega izobraževanja (Ljubljana: Republiški sekretariat za ljudsko obrambo, 1985); Polde Štukelj, 
Osnove civilne zaščite, peta izdaja (Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1985).
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total mobilisation. The YPA would wage active defence in depth through-
out the country. It would transform itself into smaller units waging pre-
dominately partisan warfare alongside the TD only if combat by larger 
formations failed to dissuade the enemy from continuing his attempt to 
control the country.
That fundamental change in the YPA’s role in national defence had 
given rise to specific changes in YPA organisation. The major goal of con-
tinued modernisation of the YPA was the development of a modern mobile 
infantry, well-armed with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. At that time 
in the early 1970’s political and military leaders insisted that it would be 
pointless for Yugoslavia to attempt to compete with the Great Powers with 
tanks, aircraft, or other heavy modern weaponry, and that modernization 
of the YPA should not delay the arming of the TO. Second, the build-up of 
the TO had meant a relative de-emphasis of YPA reserves. Around 80 per-
cent of YPA conscripts were subsequently assigned to the TO; 20 percent 
to the active or reserve YPA. Third, the nature of military manoeuvres had 
changed markedly. In the early 1960’s, YPA manoeuvres usually simulated 
the conventional defence of cities, including mass evacuation of non-com-
batants. In the 1970’s manoeuvres had usually involved joint defence by 
YPA and TO units against large-scale armoured invasion. Fourth, the YPA 
had begun to transfer some support functions (medical care, food supply, 
some engineering services) to the TO or the civilian sector.21
The increasing militarisation of the LYC and the federal government, 
and the increasing power and influence of the YPA in Yugoslav poli-
tics and society that went with it, caused a fundamental shift in power 
in the Yugoslav political system after 1966. A process of increasing YPA 
power and influence that began in 1966 gathered momentum in 1974 and 
became even more pronounced after Tito’s death in 1980. In the 1980’s 
after Tito’s death and crisis in Yugoslavia, the Federal Presidency as the 
collective leadership body, which was re-elected annually, could not 
either legally or practically perform operational functions of the Supreme 
Commander, especially on a daily basis. Its operational command func-
21 Johnson, “Total National Defense,” 7–8.
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tions were, in fact only nominal. The YPA became the “backbone” of the 
country’s political system and social order, with enough political power 
and influence to make the idea of YPA regime come true, but fortunately 
this did not happen. The critics of the existing defence security system in 
the 1980’s were able to become more vocal. Demands regarding a stron-
ger centralisation process were justified by growing frictions within the 
state communist leadership and economic problems.22
Conclusion
By adopting the concept of General People’s Resistance and Social-Self 
Protection as the permanent form of defending the freedom, national 
independence, sovereignty and self-managing socio-political system, the 
Yugoslav socialist-oriented society developed the Total People’s Defence. 
The new military and the development of its operational use on the basis 
of the strategy of armed conflict were introduced in Yugoslavia after the 
Warsaw Pact forces had invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, his-
torical development began much earlier; the concept was based on Yugo-
slavia’s own strategic lessons learned from the past, especially from the 
period of the Second World War and the National Liberation Movement. 
It was modified according to the estimated geo-strategic and geo-politi-
cal position of Yugoslavia at the time, and lessons learned from the wars 
after the Second World War, and developments in military technology. 
The System of Total People’s Defence, which stressed its total nature, cre-
ated the reality of the already mentioned concept of a “nation in arms” 
which attached great importance to soldiers and the art of soldiering in 
Yugoslavia. Despite the well thought out concept of the General People’s 
Defence and Social Self-Protection, the latter failed to find answers on 
how to defy the “internal enemy” and how to solve internal political and 
economic national problems which amassed in Yugoslavia in the 1970s 
and the 1980s.
22 Marko Milivojević, Bradford Studies on Yugoslavia, 13, The Yugoslav People’s Army (Brad-
ford: University of Bradford, 1988) 10, 28.
204 Blaž Torkar
After the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in the 1990’s, the 
Doctrine of Total People’s Defence has been forgotten and characterised 
as an old doctrine which is outdated in the context of the contemporary 
security situation. Nevertheless, Slovenian Territorial Defence can also be 
seen as a positive phenomenon, which derived from the Doctrine of Total 
People’s Defence. Since its establishment in 1968, Slovenian Territorial 
Defence developed differently from similar organisations in other federal 
republics. Many among its few professional servicemembers and, partic-
ularly, members of the large reserve component considered the creation 
of the Slovenian Territorial Defence a resuscitation of the idea of Slove-
nian own armed forces. Among TO members in Slovenia and among the 
Slovenian population, the TO was increasingly considered as Slovenian 
Armed Forces, and as such part of the Yugoslav Armed Forces. In the 
1990s the Slovenian TO became the basis for developing Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Slovenia, even at the price of a military confrontation 
with the YPA.
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